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Abstract
Although previous studies have shown the importance to agricultural invest-
ments of understanding land tenure security (LTS), to date, little quantitative ev-
idence has been published regarding the effects of understanding LTS. This study
contributes to the current research by showing the causal effect on agricultural in-
vestments of understanding LTS. In detail, we examine whether understanding the
increase in the duration of agricultural land-use rights improves farmers’ investments
in agriculture. Under the new land law passed in November 2013 in Vietnam, the
usage duration of annual cropland and aquaculture land increased significantly from
20 years to 50 years, which makes Vietnam a compelling case study for testing this
hypothesis. We use panel data from the Viet Nam Access to Resources Household
Survey (VARHS) collected in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. The balanced panel data
include 1834 households. Difference-in-difference with fixed effects (DID-FE) is em-
ployed to estimate the causal impacts. We find that understanding the increase in
the duration of agricultural land-use rights increases investments in irrigation/soil
conservation/water conservation and the adoption of organic fertilizer, which sup-
ports the positive impacts of understanding LTS on sustainable investments.
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1 Introduction
Agricultural land tenure security (LTS) plays a crucial role in reducing poverty and achieving
rural development (Higgins et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2012). LTS is defined as a degree of certainty
that “a person’s rights to land will be recognized by others and protected in cases of specific
challenges” (FAO, 2002). According to a report by World Bank (2013), 63% of the poor have
engaged in agricultural activities. Thus, agricultural land property rights are considered key
factors to improve the livelihood of the poor by enhancing agricultural productivity and income
from agriculture (Lawry et al., 2017).
Increased agricultural LTS is believed to incentivize farmers to invest more in agriculture,
which will induce higher productivity and income from agricultural activities (Feder and Nishio,
1998; Besley, 1995). However, current empirical studies on the impacts of LTS interventions
have shown mixed results. Santos et al. (2014) found significant effects of land allocation and
registration programs on the adoption of fertilizers and improved seeds in West Bengal, India.
Paltasingh (2018) also showed positive impacts of LTS on the adoption of modern rice technology
in Odisha, Eastern India. In contrast, nonsignificant impacts on the adoption of fertilizers,
manure or pesticides were found in Malawi (Mendola and Simtowe, 2015) and Fiji (Kumari and
Nakano, 2016).
Several qualitative studies have pointed out that a lack of understanding LTS amongst ben-
eficiaries of LTS interventions constrained the impacts of such interventions (Yami and Snyder,
2016; Leeuwen, 2017; Mazhawidza et al., 2011). Lack of knowledge on LTS is especially relevant
in the context of developing countries that have often introduced new land laws without a suffi-
cient focus on disseminating information and explanations about them (Deininger et al., 2008).
In a review paper about the impacts of rural LTS, Higgins et al. (2018) emphasized the need
for quantitative evidence about the impacts of knowledge on LTS, as most quantitative studies
begin with the assumption that the respondents recognize LTS and move directly to evaluating
the impacts of LTS interventions.
Despite the importance of understanding LTS that has been highlighted in the previous
literature, to date, there have been only a few quantitative studies regarding the effects of un-
derstanding LTS. To the best of our knowledge, Deininger et al. (2008) was the main exception.
Using cross-sectional data from Uganda, they found that legal knowledge, including awareness
of land rights, restrictions on land use and recognition of women’s land rights, increased land-
related investments (tree plantation and soil conservation) and land productivity. In addition to
the main finding mentioned above, they found interesting associations between rights to transfer
land, length of occupancy and land-related investments. Rights to transfer land were positively
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correlated with visible investment, such as investment in tree plantations, which was expected
to affect land value. However, length of occupancy was positively associated with invisible in-
vestments, such as soil conservation, which improved soil fertility in a sustainable manner. To
control for unobserved household characteristics, such as mental agility and interest in com-
munity affairs, which could affect both levels of legal knowledge and land-related investments,
Deininger et al. (2008) applied an instrumental approach. The instrumental variables included
three sets of retrospective variables: radio ownership and parents’ educational attainment, pre-
vious land conflicts, and previous land sales market participation. However, these instrumental
variables might not satisfy the exogeneity condition and exclusion restriction assumptions. To
suggest further policy implications, it is necessary to rigorously investigate the causal effects of
legal knowledge.
In this study, we used DID-FE with panel household data to examine whether understanding
the increase in the duration of agricultural land use increased the agricultural investments of
farmers. Because of the significant changes in the usage duration of agricultural land, Viet-
nam provides a compelling case study for testing this hypothesis. Under the new law passed
in November 2013, the usage duration of annual cropland and aquaculture land in Vietnam
increased from 20 years to 50 years. This study used panel data from the Viet Nam Access
to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) collected in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016, before and
after the 2013 new land law1. The balanced panel data included 1834 households. We found
that farmers’ understanding the increase in the duration of agricultural land use increased their
investments in irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation and adoption of organic fertilizer.
This study contributes to the current research regarding the impacts of knowledge on LTS
on agricultural investments in two ways. First, we provide quantitative evidence on the impact
of understanding LTS on agricultural investments, which has received little attention in the
previous literature. Our findings highlight the positive impacts of understanding LTS on farmers’
investments in soil fertility, such as the adoption of organic fertilizer and spending more money
and labor on irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation. Second, we use balanced panel
data collected before and after the new land law, which allows us to control for both unobserved
and observed time-variant variables. In addition, we check the parallel trend assumption. Thus,
we can estimate the causal impacts of understanding LTS on agricultural investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on the
duration of agricultural land tenure in Vietnam. Section 3 presents the data descriptions, and
Section 4 presents the methodology. The results and discussion are provided in Section 5. Section
1The 2014 VARHS data were used only to identify the balanced panel household data. They are not
included in the main analysis because the outcome variables (household investments) in the 2014 data
contained investments both before and after 2013 new land law.
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6 concludes by offering recommendations and policy implications.
2 Background: Changes in agricultural land tenure in
Vietnam
Since the introduction of "Doi Moi", a set of innovation reforms, in 1986, Vietnam has seen
significant changes in the agricultural sector. Considerable reform regarding the duration of
agricultural land-use rights was emphasized in land laws passed in 1998, 1993, and 2013.
The 1988 land law granted the transfer of land-use rights from collectives to individual
households.Agricultural investment decisions and the usage of output were also privatized to farm
households (Kemper et al., 2015; Menon et al., 2014). This liberalization played an important
role in encouraging farmers to put effort into their lands, which contributed to the growth of
Vietnam’s agricultural output (Pingali and Vo-Tong, 1992). However, as the land-use rights were
not tradable, many farmers felt insecure and reluctant to make long-term investments (Menon
et al., 2014).
To strengthen property rights over land, the government passed a new land law in 1993
that allowed landowners to trade, transfer, rent, bequeath, and mortgage their land-use rights.
The law also regulated the duration of land allocation and issued land-use certificates. Annual
cropland and aquaculture land could be used for 20 years, whereas perennial cropland could be
used for 50 years. These reforms were expected to increase farmers’ investments in agriculture,
especially durable investments. However, it was common for farmers to gradually decrease their
investments according to the expiration time of their agricultural land tenure. In 2000, the share
of agricultural investments in the total investment of the whole country was 13.2%; however,
this percentage decreased by half in 2009 (World Bank, 2012).
To inspire the long-term investments of farmers, the 2013 land law was approved. A notable
regulation in the new law was the considerable increase in the usage duration of annual cropland
and aquaculture land from 20 years to 50 years. Understanding the increase in the duration of
agricultural land use has the potential to reduce uncertainty and incentivize farmers to make
long-term investments for two reasons. First, the longer usage term reduces the likelihood that
the government will expropriate the land-use rights from the farmers and their offspring, which
makes them confident in making long-term investments (Do and Iyer, 2008). In addition, farmers
have more time to enjoy the fruits of their investments. Second, it is easier to obtain loans with
stronger land-use rights because of their value as collateral in the credit market (Menon et al.,
2014). Thus, farmers can invest in improvements with high initial costs, such as irrigation.
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There have been several studies evaluating the impacts on land titling of the 1993 land law
in Vietnam (Do and Iyer, 2008; Kemper et al., 2015; Menon et al., 2014). However, the impacts
of understanding the increase in the duration of agricultural land use of the 2013 land law have
not yet been examined. This topic is especially important in Vietnam and other developing
countries where new land laws have often been introduced with limited effort to implement
them or disseminate information about them. In the 2016 VARHS data, only 24.6% of the
respondents understood the change in the duration of agricultural land use mentioned in the
2013 land law (within approximately three years). Thus, it is necessary to investigate the effects
of understanding the increase in the duration of agricultural land use on farmers’ investments.
3 Data, key variables measurement, and descriptive
analysis
3.1 Data
To attain our objective, we used panel data from four rounds of the VARHS collected in 2010,
2012, 2014 and 2016, before and after the 2013 new land law. The VARHS surveys rural
households in 12 different provinces from North, Central, and South Vietnam2. Data were
collected between June and August in each survey year. The sample sizes for the 2010, 2012,
2014 and 2016 rounds were 3202, 3704, 3648, and 2669 households, respectively. The balanced
panel data for the four rounds covered 1992 households. We excluded 158 households that had
no agricultural land in all four rounds. Therefore, the final balanced panel data for analysis
included 1834 households.
The VARHS was designed to complement the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
(VHLSS), a national survey collected biennially by the General Statistics Office (GSO). While
the VHLSS focuses mainly on reflecting consumption poverty rates, the VARHS provides detailed
information on land use, labor, and credit access. Many households were surveyed in both the
VARHS and VHLSS because the VARHS re-interviewed rural households selected for the VHLSS
in 2002 and 2004. Tarp (2017) indicated the similarity between VARHS households and VHLSS
households as well as the population census. Thus, the findings from the VARHS data can be
generalized to the Vietnamese population (Tarp, 2017).
2The sampled provinces include Ha Tay, Lao Cai, Phu Tho, Lai Chau, Dien Bien, Nghe An, Quang
Nam, Khanh Hoa, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lam Dong, and Long An. In 2008, Ha Tay was subsumed into
Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam.
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3.2 Key variables measurement
We estimated the impacts of understanding the increase in the duration of agricultural land use
on investments in aquaculture, irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation, and the adoption
of organic fertilizer.
The VARHS included some questions designed to identify whether a household understood
the increase in the usage duration of agricultural land in the 2013 new land law (Table A.1).
We selected 2 questions to categorize a household in a treated group or a control group (Table
1). The first question was whether the household had heard about the 2013 new land law. The
second question was about the duration of agricultural land use rights under the new land law.
A total of 452 households that answered "yes" to the first question and "50 years" to the second
question were classified in the treated group. A total of 776 households that answered "no" to
the first question and not "50 years" to the second question were classified in control group 1.
To check the sensitivity of the results, we also compared the treated group with control group 2,
which contained the 1382 remaining households after the treated households were excluded from
the data. The descriptive statistics of the treated group, control group 1, and control group 2
are provided in table A.2. Table A.3 further reports the differences in the means of the selected
covariates between the treated group and control group 1 and between the treated group and
control group 2. In general, the treated group outperformed both control group 1 and control
group 2 in terms of education of household head, dependent ratio, dummy of poor household,
dummy of government officer, and expenditure on the Vietnamese New Year.
Table 1: Treatment identification
Treatment identification Have you heard about the new land law of 2013?
Yes No
What is the duration
of land use rights to
agricultural land?
50 years 452 households 249 households
Not 50 years 357 households 776 households
The outcome variables included cash (thousand VND) and labour (number of days) spent
on aquaculture and cash (thousand VND) and labor (number of days) spent on irrigation/soil
conservation/water conservation within the previous two years3. Another outcome variable was
cash spent on organic fertilizer (thousand VND) within the previous 12 months. All monetary
values were adjusted for inflation in Vietnam. Specific descriptions of each outcome variable are
provided in table A.4. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the outcome variables in the four
rounds: 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. In general, cash spent on irrigation/soil conservation/water
31 USD is equal to approximately 23,000 VND
6
conservation and the adoption of organic fertilizer increased from 2010 to 2016, while cash spent
on aquaculture fluctuated during this period.
The covariates in this study were divided into two groups: household head features and
household characteristics. The household head features included age and education (years of
education) of the household head. Household characteristics included family size (number of
family members), expenditure on the "Tet" holiday (Vietnamese New Year holiday) (thousand
VND), a dummy of government officers, a dummy of poor household, and dependent ratio.
Specific descriptions of each covariate are provided in table A.5. The descriptive statistics of
these variables from 2010-2016 are presented in table 2. The average age and the average years
of education of the household head in 2016 were 57.23 years old and 7.62 years, respectively. On
average, a household had four members and spent 4.7 million VND during the Tet holiday in
2016. The 2016 VARHS data showed that 15% of the households were poor households.
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4 Methods
To evaluate the effects on agricultural investments of understanding the increase in the duration
of agricultural land use in the 2013 new land law , we employed difference-in-difference with fixed
effects (DID-FE) regression with two time periods: 2012 and 2016. The 2010 data were used
to check the parallel trend assumption. The 2014 data were not included in the main analysis
because the household investments (our outcome variables) in the data contained investments
both before and after the 2013 new land law4.
The following model is estimated:
Yit = β0 + β1timet + β2householdi + β3timet · treatedi + β4Xit + it (1)
where Yit represents the outcome variables investments in aquaculture, irrigation/soil con-
servation/water conservation, and organic fertilizer adoption. timet is the dummy of periods
after 2013 (after policy intervention). timet = 1 indicates 2016, while timet = 0 indicates 2012.
householdi denotes the time-invariant household-level unmeasured variable. treatedi indicates
the dummy of the treated group (whether the household understood the duration of agricul-
tural land change). Xit includes time-variant household characteristics that can affect both
treatment status and outcome variables (for example, family size, dummy of poor household,
education of household head, age of household head and expenditure on Vietnamese New Year).
The coefficient of interest β3 shows the impacts of understanding the increase in the duration
of agricultural land use on the outcome variable Yit. In the basic DID model, the dummy of
treatment status treatedi was included. However, this variable was absorbed by householdi
because household fixed effects were controlled in our model.
The strength of our model is that both observed and unobserved time-invariant household
characteristics influencing the treatment and outcome variables were controlled. In addition, we
controlled for some time-variant household characteristics that could affect both outcomes and
treatment status, for instance, age and education of household head, family size, expenditure on
Vietnamese New Year, and dependent ratio. Thus, the potential self-selection bias was largely
addressed.
DID estimates require the parallel trend assumption, which requests constant differences
over time between the outcome variables of the treated group and the outcome variables of the
control group in the absence of treatment (Lechner, 2010). In other words, unobserved time-
variant characteristics cannot affect the treatment status and outcome variables. Although this
4In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked about their investments in irrigation/soil conser-
vation/water conservation and their investments in aquaculture in the previous 2 years. They were also
asked about cash spent on organic fertilizer adoption in the previous year.
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assumption could not be tested directly, we checked the trend with some periods of data that
were collected before the treatment implementation. In this study, the 2010 data and 2012 data,
collected before the 2013 new land law, were used to examine the parallel trend assumption.
To confirm the consistency of the DID-FE estimates, we employed DID-FE with the propen-
sity score matching (PSM) method. PSM estimates the propensity score, which is the probability
that a household will understand the change in the duration of agricultural land use in the 2013
new land law given a set of covariates that cannot be affected by the understanding of the
change. We used the same covariates for both DID-FE and DID-FE with PSM. The households
that were outside the common support were excluded from the analysis. Thus, if the treated
and control households were very different, they were eliminated from the data analysis.
5 Results and discussion
Table 3 shows the average treatment effect (ATE) results between the treated group and control
group 1. Outcome variables included cash spent on irrigation/soil conservation/water conserva-
tion (thousand VND), labour spent on irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation (days),
cash spent on aquaculture (thousand VND), labour spent on aquaculture (days), and cash spent
on the adoption of organic fertilizer (thousand VND). All outcome variables were measured
within two years after the data collection in 2016, except cash spent on adoption of organic
fertilizer, which was measured within a year. Monetary outcomes were adjusted for inflation in
Vietnam.
Model 1, model 2, and model 3 of table 3 report the results from DID-FE without con-
trolling for covariates, DID-FE controlling for covariates, and DID-FE with PSM, respectively.
Nine households lying outside the common support were excluded from the DID-FE with PSM
estimation. As mentioned earlier, we controlled for the same covariates for DID-FE and DID-FE
with PSM. The controlled covariates included age and education of household head, family size,
dependent ratio, dummy of poor household, dummy of government officer, and expenditure on
Vietnamese New Year.
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Regarding investments in irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation, we found robust,
positive and significant impacts in all three models. Households that understood the increase
in the duration of agricultural land use increased their cash spent on irrigation/soil conserva-
tion/water conservation by 565,040 VND compared with households that did not understand
the increase in the duration of agricultural land use. The results from DID-FE without con-
trolling for covariates (model 1) and DID-FE with PSM (model 3) also showed increases of
601,940 VND and 564,780 VND, respectively. All estimates were significant at 1%. In addition,
we found an increase in labour spent on irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation by 1.33
days, 1.53 days, and 1.54 days for model 1, model 2, and model 3, respectively. All estimates
were significant at 10%.
In addition, we found robust, positive and significant impacts on organic fertilizer adoption.
This finding indicated that the increase in the duration of agricultural land use increased the cash
spent on the adoption of organic fertilizer by 568,040 VND in model 1, 544,960 VND in model
2, and 545,560 VND in model 3. In other words, households that understood the increase in the
usage duration of agricultural land spent approximately 544,960 VND more on organic fertilizer
adoption than households that did not understand the change. All results were significant at
the 5% level.
Our findings were consistent with those of Deininger et al. (2008). Using cross-sectional data
from Uganda, they found positive impacts on soil conservation and number of trees planted for
5 years of legal knowledge, including awareness of land rights and restrictions on land use as
well of recognition of women’s land rights. Besley (1995) theoretically and empirically proved
the relationship between greater LTS and incentives for long-term investments and sustainable
land management. In this study, the usage duration of annual cropland and aquaculture land in-
creased significantly from 20 years to 50 years. The longer usage term decreased the probability
that the land-use rights would be expropriated by the government, which made the farmers feel
secure and confident in making long-term investments (Do and Iyer, 2008). In addition, farmers
have more time to enjoy the fruits of their labor, which might encourage them to maintain and
improve soil fertility for longer cultivation periods. As a result, positive significant impacts were
found regarding sustainable agricultural investments such as cash spent on irrigation/soil con-
servation/water conservation, labour spent on irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation,
and cash spent on the adoption of organic fertilizer.
To check the sensitivity of our results, we also compared the treatment group and control
group 2. The results are shown in appendix table A.6. In general, the findings were consistent
with those from the previous comparison between treatment group and control group 1. We
observed increases of 515,930 VND and 1.30 days in cash and labour spent on irrigation/soil
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conservation/water conservation, respectively. The estimates were significant at 10% in all
models. Although there was an increase in cash spent on the adoption of organic fertilizer, the
impact was nonsignificant. In addition, the results from the comparison between treatment group
and control group 2 had lower coefficients than those from the comparison between treatment
group and control group 1. This difference could be interpreted as follows. Control group
2 included households that said that they did not know about the 2013 land law, but they
gave a correct answer to the question about the duration of agricultural land use, which might
constrain the impacts of knowledge on the increase in the duration of agricultural land use. The
respondents might know a little about the law but might not be confident in their knowledge;
thus, they might have answered that they had not heard about the changes in the 2013 land
law. In addition, control group 2 included households that answered "yes" to the first question
and "100 years" to the second question. Those households might know of the increase in the
duration of agricultural land use, but they did not know the exact extent of the new duration.
Therefore, the inclusion of those households in control group 2 might underestimate the impacts
of their understanding of the increase in the duration of agricultural land use.
The parallel trend is the most critical assumption of DID. We tested this assumption using
the 2010 and 2012 data, collected before the 2013 new land law. Table 4 shows the test for
comparison between the treatment group and control group 1. The results indicated that the
parallel trend assumption was satisfied. There were no statistically significant differences in any
outcome variables between 2012 and 2010.
6 Conclusions and policy implications
This study aimed to examine the impacts of understanding the increase in the usage duration of
agricultural land on sustainable investments in irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation
and the adoption of organic fertilizer. We used VARHS panel household data collected in 2010,
2012, 2014 and 2016, before and after the implementation of the 2013 new land law. DID-
FE was employed to estimate the causal impact of understanding the change in the duration of
agricultural land use. To check the sensitivity of the DID-FE estimates, we applied DID-FE with
PSM. The parallel trend assumption was also examined using the 2010 and 2012 VARHS data.
We found that households that understood the increase in the usage duration of agricultural
land spent more money and labour input on irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation
than households that did not understand the change in the duration of agricultural land use. In
addition, the former spent more cash on organic fertilizer adoption than the latter.
Our findings provide causal evidence to support the impacts of LTS knowledge on agricul-
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tural investments, which have remained unclear in the previous literature. However, in our
data, only 24.6% of households understood the increase in the duration of agricultural land use
within approximately three years (from November 2013 to the data collection period in 2016).
Thus, policymakers should pay more attention to improving farmers’ knowledge of LTS. This
implication is especially significant for developing countries that have introduced new land laws
without paying attention to implementing them. Improving farmers’ knowledge about LTS could
increase their investments in sustainable agriculture, which contributes to the second aim of sus-
tainable development goals (SDGs), which focus on ending hunger and promoting agricultural
sustainability.
The external validity of this study might be limited to the 12 provinces surveyed in the
VARHS. However, as discussed in section 3, the VARHS data showed similarities with the VHLSS
data and population census. Therefore, we can extrapolate the findings from the VARHS data
to the Vietnamese population (Tarp, 2017).
Due to the limitations of the questionnaire survey, we could not distinguish when the house-
hold had heard of and understood the change in the duration of agricultural land use between
November 2013 and the data collection period in 2016. Thus, the treated households might have
learned of and understand the increase in the usage duration of agricultural land at different
times, which could constrain the impacts. However, we conducted several approaches to guaran-
tee the consistency and reliability of our findings. We compared the treated group with control
group 1 and control group 2. DID-FE with PSM was also applied to verify the sensitivity of the
DID-FE estimates. Additionally, we carefully checked the parallel trend assumption. In general,
the assumption was satisfied, and the results were consistent.
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Table A.1: VARHS questionnaire related to 2013 new land law
1 Have you heard about the new 
Land Law from 2013? 
1. YES 
2. NO>>Q3  
2 How much do you know about 
the new land law? 
1. NO KNOWLEDGE AT ALL 
2. LITTLE KNOWLEDGE 
3. SOME KNOWLEDGE 
4. SUBSTANTIAL KNOWLEDGE 
3 What is the duration of Land 
Use Rights to agricultural 
land? 
 
ASK EVEN IF ANSWER TO 
Q1 IS "NO" 
1. 10 YEARS 
2. 20 YEARS 
3. 50 YEARS 
4. 100 YEARS 
5. DO NOT KNOW 
4 When the government 
confiscates a plot of land, and 
there is no other land available 
for compensation, what 
compensation is the land user 
entitled to? CHOOSE ONE 
 
ASK EVEN IF ANSWER TO 
Q1 IS "NO" 
1. NO COMPENSATION 
2. HALF THE MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND 
3. THE MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND 
4. ONE AND A HALF TIMES THE MARKET 
VALUE OF THE LAND 
5. COMPENSATION IS ARBITRARILY 
DECIDED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
6. DO NOT KNOW 
5 From which sources have you 
mainly heard  
about these issues (mentioned 
in Q3-4)? 
 
STATE TWO MOST 
IMPORTANT 
1. HAVE NOT HEARD ABOUT THESE ISSUES  
2. TV, RADIO, NEWSPAPER, INTERNET 
3. PUBLIC LOUDSPEAKERS 
4. FRIENDS AND FAMILY 
5. MEETING ARRANGED BY COMMUNE 
AUTHORITIES TO INFORM ABOUT LAW 
6. EXTENSION AGENT/AGRICULTURAL 
ORGANISATION 
7. OTHER GROUPS OR MASS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
8. OTHER 
 (Source: 2016 VARHS questionnaire)
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Table A.4: Description of outcome variables
Outcome variables Description
Cash spent on irrigation/soil conserva-
tion/water conservation (1,000 VND)
Cash spent on irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation show the
total cash the households spent on all irrigation and soil and water
conservation improvements (for example, rock bunds, soil bunds/grass
lines, terraces, brick walls, irrigation systems and other related invest-
ments) during the previous 2 years.
Labour spent on irrigation/soil conserva-
tion/water conservation (days)
Labour spent on irrigation/soil conservation/water conservation show
total days of labor spent by the households on all irrigation and soil
and water conservation improvements during the previous 2 years.
Cash spent on aquaculture (1,000 VND) Cash spent on aquaculture indicate the total cash the households in-
vested in aquaculture (for example, ponds and shrimp farms) during
the previous 2 years.
Labour spent on aquaculture (days) Labour spent on aquaculture indicate total days of labour spent by the
households on investments in aquaculture during the previous 2 years.
Organic fertilizer adoption (1,000 VND) Organic fertilizer adoption show the value of the organic fertilizer used
by the households during the previous 12 months.
Table A.5: Description of covariates
Covariates Description
Household head features
Age of household head Age of household head
Education of household head
(years of education)
Education of household head (years of education)
Household characteristics
Family size Number of family members in the household
Dependent ratio Ratio of number of dependent people [age <6 or age >60]/Family size
Dummy of poor household Whether a household is catergorized as a poor household or not
Dummy of government officer Whether a household has at least a member working in the
public sector
Expenditure on Tet holiday
(1,000 VND)
Expenditure on Vietnamese New Year (Lunar New Year)
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